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Experts 
by Carl E. Schneider 
George Bernard Shaw famously said that all professions are con-
spiracies against the laity. Less 
famously, less elegantly, but at least as 
accurately, Andrew Abbott argued that 
professions are conspiracies against each 
other. Professions compete for authority 
to do work and for authority over work. 
The umpire in these skirmishes and 
sieges is the government, for the state 
holds the gift of monopoly and the 
power to regulate it. 
In Abbott's terms, "bioethics" is con-
testing medicine's power to influence 
the way doctors treat patients. If it fol-
lows the classic pattern, bioethics will 
solicit work and authority by recruiting 
government's power. A homely but ex-
emplary recent case suggests one form 
that the struggle can take and some 
terms it may employ. 
The case is Hall v. Anwar. 1 Its story is 
sad. When Larry Joseph Hall was born 
prematurely, he weighed only 822 
grams. He was "blue, flaccid, and limp." 
Dr. Anwar tried to resuscitate him. 
Nurses recorded "a decreasing heart 
rate." Dr. Anwar, however, said at the 
subsequent trial that he never heard a 
heartbeat, and he gave the boy an 
APGAR score of zero, which meant he 
believed there was no heartbeat. After 
trying to revive the infant for eleven 
minutes, Dr. Anwar concluded that he 
was dead. The child was "wrapped in a 
blanket and placed in a warmer." Fif-
teen minutes later, however, "a techni-
cian noticed that the infant was grimac-
ing and attempting to cry." Dr. Anwar 
was summoned and "resumed efforts to 
resuscitate the child." The child lived 
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but did not prosper. He "suffers various 
conditions including severe brain dam-
age." 
The Halls sued Dr. Anwar and the 
hospital for malpractice. They claimed 
that Dr. Anwar and the nurses per-
formed negligently when they first tried 
to revive Larry and that they should 
have persisted for more than eleven 
minutes. 
As in many malpractice cases, the 
trial in Hall considered whether the al-
leged malpractice had actually caused 
the patient's disabilities (whether, that 
is, anything Dr. Anwar and the hospital 
did worsened Larry's medical problems 
or whether, instead, "internal condi-
tions during the pregnancy caused all of 
the infant's injuries"). But the case's in-
terest for us arises out of the Halls' argu-
ment that Dr. Anwar performed below 
the "medical standard of care." Various 
doctors testified that he did not. Dr. 
Anwar's lawyer also presented a video-
tape of 
deposition testimony of Father 
John Paris, a Catholic priest and 
professor of bioethics .... This de-
position had been taken during dis-
covery by the Halls' attorney with-
out any cross-examination by the 
defendants. Father Paris is an expert 
in the area of medical ethics. He 
has spent significant time in hospi-
tals and engaged in professional ac-
tivities in conjunction with medical 
professionals. 
The priest-ethicist "attempted to pro-
vide an expert opinion that Dr. Anwar's 
actions concerning all aspects of the re-
suscitation were 'appropriate' and 'with-
in the standard of care."' 
The jury found that Dr. Anwar was 
not liable, and the Halls appealed. The 
Halls contended that the trial judge 
should not have let the jury see the ethi-
cist's deposition. The appellate court 
agreed. 
The appellate opinion is in many 
ways quite a typical product of a com-
mon law court. The opinion confronts a 
question courts have not fully explored: 
to what extent can bioethicists testify as 
experts in medical malpractice trials? 
But the opinion refuses to evaluate that 
question as an abstract issue or even to 
decide it as a matter of principle. 
Rather, the court asks whether the spe-
cific testimony of the specific witness in 
the specific case should have been ad-
mitted. The theory of common law ad-
judication ratifies this reticence. That 
theory expects that-if the issue is im-
portant-it will recur in other cases in 
various forms. Each new instantiation 
will present somewhat different facts, 
and each court will ask whether the spe-
cific evidence should be admitted in 
light of the gathering precedent and the 
new circumstances. After this process of 
garnering examples and testing princi-
ples has proceeded for a while, courts 
can begin to draw broad rules from the 
developing pattern of holdings about 
the admissibility of ethicists' testimony. 
The process is incremental, cautious, 
concrete, pragmatic, and (however fee-
bly) empirical. It can also be opaque, 
unreflective, and erratic, particularly in 
its early stages. 
The Hall court began with black-let-
ter law. Malpractice is a failure to meet a 
profession's minimum standards. Pro-
fessions handle abstruse and technical 
problems laymen do not understand. 
They thus must set their own standards. 
As one typical formulation puts it, doc-
tors must "exercise that degree of care, 
skill, and learning expected of a reason-
ably prudent" doctor in the same spe-
cialty. The jury must be told what med-
icine's standards are, but only by people 
who understand them-by profession-
als, and even professionals in the same 
specialty. The Hall court cited a case 
that held that "a pulmonary specialist 
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[is] not qualified to opine on [the] stan-
dard of care of [an] emergency room 
physician." 
The court then applied the general 
rule to the specific case: "Father Paris 
was not qualified to render opinions 
about a medical standard of care." The 
court did not suggest that the priest was 
not some kind of expert. But he was the 
wrong kind: "If Father Paris had testi-
fied solely as to whether it was moral or 
ethical to resuscitate or terminate resus-
citation of the infant, then his testimo-
ny would have been irrelevant to the 
legal issue of malpractice." The "legal 
issue of malpractice" is whether profes-
sional standards are violated, and who 
knows better than members of the pro-
fession? 
The court saw one of the problems 
with this argument: "We recognize that 
some medical standards of care are in-
fluenced by medical ethics. A decision 
concerning the termination of resuscita-
tion efforts is probably an example of an 
area in which the standard of care in-
cludes an ethical component." The 
court saw the problem, but its answer 
was perhaps rather conclusory: "The 
standard of care . . . still involves the 
level of care owed by a similar health 
care provider and not that owed by an 
ethicist." Again, malpractice is a breach 
of professional standards; professionals 
know those standards best. 
Implicitly invoking common law 
theory, the Hall court warned that "the 
testimony of a medical ethicist might be 
appropriate in some circumstance." The 
court suggestively cited two cases. In 
one, the plaintiff alleged that she told 
her doctor her relations with her ex-hus-
band were "extremely strained" but that 
the doctor called the ex-husband to ask 
about her use of pain medications 
(which led him to sue for custody of the 
couple's children). In the other case, the 
plaintiff said her chiropractor had be-
come her psychotherapist and had "sex-
ually assaulted" her in violation of a law 
making it a crime for "an individual 
who purports to provide professional 
medical or counseling services to engage 
in a sexual act with a client or patient." 
Closer examination reveals that nei-
ther case seems to presage any consider-
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able role for bioethicists in testifYing 
about what the medical standard of care 
should be. Neither case seems to raise 
questions about what medical goals are 
proper or about what medical means are 
effective. The issue in both cases was es-
sentially whether the behavior com-
plained of was unethical. But that be-
havior violated such elementary ethical 
principles that an ethicist might be 
called simply to report on what stan-
dards the medical profession had actual-
ly adopted, rather than to opine on 
what was ethically desirable. Indeed, the 
behavior was so flagrant that one might 
wonder whether any kind of expert tes-
timony is needed to establish its impro-
priety. 
This leads us to another objection to 
the Hall court's "professions set profes-
sional standards" principle-that pro-
fessions may indulge themselves in lax 
standards. How might future courts re-
spond to this objection? Courts are not 
naive enough to believe that professions 
always set optimal standards. Judges 
know Shaw's aphorism. Bur they seem 
to have concluded that they are poorly 
situated to rewrite medicine's standards. 
The most conspicuous effort to do so--
a case about when ophthalmologists 
should test patients for glaucoma-was 
subsequently attacked on medical 
grounds and speedily reversed by the 
legislature. Courts seem, then, to be-
lieve that the best is the enemy of the 
good and that any governmental super-
vention of medical standards should 
come from other agencies of the state. 
Even if courts were more confident 
of their own capacity to revise medi-
cine's standards, they might still doubt 
bioethicists' ability to do so. A scent of 
this motive perhaps wafts from the 
opinion in Hall. The appellate court 
ruled that the trial court should have ex-
cluded the ethicist's testimony. But the 
court refused to order a new trial be-
cause that error was "harmless." Among 
other things, the 
testimony was often very abstract, 
describing such things as the "meta-
physical" and "epistemological" is-
sues associated with the "post-
Kantian world" and its view that 
"perception is the real." It is not 
surprising that all of the lawyers es-
sentially ignored this testimony 
during closing arguments. 
Expert testimony is ordinarily admitted 
only where it rests on some kind of "sci-
entific, technical, or other specialized 
knowledge" which can "assist the trier 
of fact." The Supreme Court has in-
voked the dictionary definition of 
"knowledge"-a "body of known facts 
or any body of ideas inferred from such 
facts or accepted as truths on good 
grounds." Science is the modal case, 
and scientific validity is tested by asking 
questions like whether a theory is "de-
rived by the scientific method," whether 
it can be and has been empirically test-
ed, and whether it is widely accepted. 
Did the Hall court doubt that ethicists 
produce "knowledge" of the sort that 
leads courts to admit expert testimony? 
Did the Hall court doubt that testimo-
ny so "abstract" could assist any likely 
trier of fact? 
We have been considering Hall v. 
Anwar as an example of interprofession-
al competition between medicine and 
bioethics. But does it also reflect such a 
competition between law and both 
those disciplines? The priest-ethicist's 
presumed expertise was to say what is 
right and wrong. Such normative deci-
sions, however, are precisely the work of 
judges and juries. What, the Hall judges 
may have asked themselves, gives the 
ethicist a deeper insight into right and 
wrong than we have? A more legitimate 
insight? The court twice strongly im-
plied that, had the ethicist's testimony 
rested on his religious beliefs, it would 
have been self-evidently inadmissible. 
But did the court think that any other 
basis for his testimony would have en-
dowed it with any more legitimacy than 
the conclusions of the trial court as the 
interpreter of the law's precedent or of 
the jury as the interpreter of the com-
munity's standards? 
1. 774 So2d 41 (Ct App Fla 2000). 
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